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1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen major changes in the functionality of national tax systems. Sabirianova Peter
et al. (2009) investigate 189 countries over more than two decades and conclude that there is an overall
pattern of reduced tax rates for high incomes and decreasing overall tax progressivity. This decline is
observed in a time period that has seen rising measures of both wealth and income inequality in most
parts of the Western industrialized world (Atkinson et al., 2011). Previous research interested in these
co-developments has shown that there is indeed a strong connection between taxation and inequality in
general. Especially taxation of top incomes has been found to be an important policy tool to steer eco-
nomic inequality (Leigh, 2007; Roine et al., 2009). Research in distributional economics has moreover
concluded that capital incomes are to a large degree concentrated at the very top of the income distribu-
tion (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Thus, capital incomes can be thought of as one of the driving forces of the
distributional dynamics of an economy, as also brought forward in Bengtsson andWaldenström (2018).
The close association of economic inequality and taxation gave rise to a long-standing research tra-
dition in political science and economics focusing in turn on the relationship of voting behavior and
economic inequality (see e.g. Roemer, 1998). Following a well-known early theoretical account of this
problem in Meltzer and Richard (1981), rational and self-interested voters with income below median
income are expected to demand some form of redistribution when they are confronted with economic
inequality. However, this does not correspond to what is usually observed empirically. A great deal
of research across the social sciences has thus been motivated by the question how and why economic
inequality can emerge and stabilize in a democratic political system.1
Various explanations for the coexistence of democracy and economic inequality have since been ad-
vanced. First, for voters to formulate preferences that are in their own interest, they would have to
perceive society and their own position within it with some accuracy. However, this is usually not the
case. Perceptions of society are on average not only wrong, but systematically distorted. This has
been well documented for perceptions of economic inequality (Norton and Ariely, 2011; Hauser and
Norton, 2017; Knell and Stix, 2017; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018) and social mobility (Davidai
and Gilovich, 2018; Alesina et al., 2018).2 Second, self-interest is not the only factor involved in the
formation of preferences for redistribution. Awide range of other determinants has thus far been found,
including beliefs, fairness considerations, personal experiences, cultural norms, religion, race and eth-
nicity (McCarty and Pontusson, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Beliefs might well differ between
various subgroups of the total population. In Austria, it has for instance been shown that mental repres-
entations and attitudes towards taxes differ systematically across employment groups (Kirchler, 1998).
1 For a comprehensive overview on the politics of inequality and redistribution, refer to McCarty and Pontusson (2011).
2 These findings in turnmotivated a number of experimental studies focused on the question how preferences for redistribution
change when misperceptions are corrected, including Cruces et al. (2013), Kuziemko et al. (2015), Karadja et al. (2017),
Fernández-Albertos and Kuo (2018), Alesina et al. (2018) and Bastani and Waldenström (2019).
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For a survey-based review of the perceptions of the distribution of wealth and an analysis of opinions
on different concepts of distributional justice in the Austrian population, refer to Melchior et al. (2015).
Moreover, whether and how individual preferences translate into policy depends also on the nature of
party politics and political institutions. More specifically, how parties act depends on their constituents,
on party competition and on the specific relationship between parties and voters (Häusermann et al.,
2013). In addition, it is well known that policy makers to a certain degree incorporate public opinion
when balancing the socioeconomic effects of taxes and their political feasibility (Mankiw et al., 2009;
Scheuer and Wolitzky, 2016). Finally, to close the circle, party identification might not only depend
on individual preferences, but individual preferences (and perceptions) might also depend on party
identification (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010). Thus, from a scholarly perspective
the perceptions and beliefs of voters and voting groups play a distinctive role when focusing on pref-
erences for redistribution and taxation in a given political system. Therefore, the factors determining
the views of the tax system on a voter level are a topic of high relevance even beyond the academicworld.
To add to this field of research in an Austrian context, this article revisits five different theoretical
frameworks and explores which views, beliefs and perceptions of individuals are connected to tax
preferences in Austria. The focus lies on two specific forms of capital taxation, namely wealth and
inheritance taxation. In addition, the analyzed beliefs and perceptions are investigated in the context
of voting behavior. For this exercise, it is explored how perceptions of society differ between various
voting groups based on self-reported partisanship in the national elections 2017.3 To accomplish this,
we rely on a new survey-based data set for Austria, covering a variety of topics relevant to this stream
of literature. This data set is used for quantitative analysis to gain insight into attitudes towards taxation
and the welfare state in Austria on a partisanship level.
The analysis of Austrian attitudes towards taxation, various aspects of the welfare state and redistri-
bution in general is structured as follows. In a first step, general approval of wealth and inheritance
taxation is discussed. After that, we try to shed light on potential idiosyncrasies that might be able to
explain differences in these tax preferences between voting groups. For this, the data is analyzed along
the lines of various theoretical channels that try to contribute to our understanding of attitudes towards
taxation and redistribution. This investigation is split into five blocks, corresponding to the respective
bodies of literature. Finally, a brief analysis of the willingness to take political action is conducted.
We find that opinions on fairness in society in general as well as perceptions of inequality are strong
predictors of support for wealth and inheritance taxation. These variables also show significant differ-
ences between respondents based on their voting behavior. Hence, these channels might be particularly
relevant to explain different tax preferences between voting groups in Austria. On the other hand, per-
3 All results in this paper refer on voting groups with respect to the Nationalratswahl 2017 on October, 15th 2017.
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ceptions of social mobility, perceptions of an individual’s own personal life as well as other channels
discussed in the literature seem to play aminor role in explaining tax preferences in the analyzed sample.
The aim and contribution of this article is three-fold. Primarily, to our knowledge this is the first article
that offers systematic quantitative analysis of why Austrians might support or reject the concepts of
wealth and inheritance taxation. Second, the article contributes to Austrian comparative politics liter-
ature by offering an in-depth partisanship level analysis of attitudes towards taxation, the welfare state,
views of fairness in society as well as perceptions of inequality and social mobility in Austria. Third,
the offered analysis employs a novel data set covering a large sample of the Austrian population. In
addition, benefits and shortcomings of this new data set are discussed. Finally, we revisit and briefly
review large parts of the literature on perceptions of society and tax preferences.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the survey design and
the data we collected. In Sections 3 and 4, the data is employed in an analysis of partisanship and tax
preferences in Austria. A brief discussion and conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2 Survey & Data
To gather data that is suitable for analysis in Austria, two large scale online surveys were conducted.
The two waves of the survey were in the field from October 17, 2018 - October 29, 2018 and March
14, 2019 - March 26, 2019, respectively. Each wave covers 2100 respondents, resulting in a total of
4200 respondents after merging the data sets.4 The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on
gender, age, voting behavior and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the
2013 Austrian Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Post-Election Survey (Kritzinger et al., 2016)
with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the general population
weights on the public use file). The survey was implemented and conducted by YouGov. This institute
is based in the UK and has been involved in a variety of high quality scientific publications (Twyman,
2008).
In the survey, respondents answer a set of questions using an online platform. Question topics include,
amongst others, socio-economic characteristics, general political views, perceptions of social mobility
and inequality in Austria, attitudes towards the welfare state and redistribution, the willingness to take
political action and approval of various forms of taxation. A list of the survey questions and possible
answers relevant to the analysis below can be found in App. A. The possibility to connect data on these
topics is rather novel in Austria and enables researchers to tackle a variety of research questions. Fur-
thermore, the two waves of the survey feature experimental treatments where respondents are treated
4 Note that there are slight differences in the placement of certain questions and in the pool of survey questions in general.
This may lead to significant difficulties when using both survey waves as one merged data set as we do in this article.
Moreover, detailed documentation of the survey is still work in progress - the data will become publicly available afterwards.
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Table 1: Voting Behavior in Data Set.
SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ GRÜN PILZ NEOS NON
20% 21% 23% 5% 7% 6% 17%
with information on inequality and social mobility. However, these treatments are not the focus of
this article and will thus not be discussed in more detail. In the analysis below, respondents subject to
information treatments are discarded to avoid confounding effects due to the treatments.
To ensure a sample of highest quality, four different implicit and explicit data quality screenings have
been applied to the raw data set. They are described in more detail in App. B. The remaining data
set includes a total of 1161 respondents. This is a rather large loss of observations as compared to
the original data set. However, credibility of the remaining data is in general high and the number of
observations is sufficient for thorough analysis.5 In terms of sample composition, a relative loss in
respondents with primary education, non-voters and FPÖ voters results from the screening procedures.
The resulting raw sample consists of 52% females and 48% males. In terms of education, 5% of
respondents fall into the primary education category, 39% in the lower secondary, 36% in the upper
secondary and the remaining 21% into the tertiary education sector.6 Regarding the age distribution
of our sample, age in years ranges from 18 to 83 and median age is 45 years. 30% of the sample are
between 18 and 34, 42% are between 35 and 54 and 28% are 55 years or older. The voting behavior of
the raw sample is documented in Tab. 1. Compared to the true population characteristics of Austria, the
sample over-represents educated and young individuals whereas old individuals are under-sampled. In
addition, voters of large parties are slightly underrepresented as compared to smaller parties. However,
this might be an artifact of oversampling highly educated individuals. In general, this is to be expected
when conducting online surveys and constitutes one of the shortcomings of this survey methodology
as also stated by Börsch-Supan and Winter (2004). An iterative post stratification strategy to re-weight
this reduced sample is thus employed to match the Austrian population in the categories age, gender,
education and voting behavior in the national elections 2017.7
An intuitive starting point for analysis on a partisanship level would be a discussion and description of
the socioeconomic characteristics of various voting groups. However, there are other surveys that are
undoubtedly better equipped to describe the objective characteristics of Austrian voters. The reader is
for instance referred to AUTNES 2017 (Aichholzer et al., 2018). In this article, the focus of analysis
5 Some questions only appear in wave two (n = 613) and are highlighted as such.
6 Primary corresponds to ”Pflichtschule”, lower secondary to ”Lehre/BMS”, upper secondary to ”AHS/BMHS” and tertiary
to ”Akademie/Kolleg/Hochschule”.
7 The marginal distributions of these variables and sources thereof as well as more information on the computed weights is
provided in App. C.
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(b) Inheritance tax.
Fig. 1: Share supporting Wealth & Inheritance Tax.
will lie on the idiosyncrasies of our data set, i.e. the subjective views, beliefs and perceptions of Aus-
trian voters on taxation, redistribution and inequality. However, interesting observations with respect
to relevant socioeconomic variables will be highlighted in the discussion when necessary.
We refrain from giving a detailed introduction and discussion of the political orientation and history
of the various parties. For a general introduction to the Austrian party system, refer to Plasser and
Ulram (2006). To give a broad idea, the social democrats SPÖ, the green party GRÜN and the splinter
group of the green party PILZ are usually described as more progressive or leftist parties. Opposed to
that, the conservative ÖVP and the far-right FPÖ cover the right-wing side of the political spectrum.
NEOS are usually attributed more leftist views on social issues while at the same time exhibiting more
right-wing attitudes on economic grounds. NON refers to declared non-voters.
The next sections present the results of our analysis. At first, general results on the opinions on wealth
and inheritance taxation in Austria are presented. After that, five subsections, each corresponding
to a specific body of literature, thoroughly analyze the data set. For each theory, the relevant survey
responses are summarized on a partisanship level. Finally, it is explored whether statistical relevance
of the theoretical channels can be established in Austria.
3 Main Results
3.1 Wealth and Inheritance Taxation in Austria
Taxation is one of the core topics in a welfare state. As a result, the specific realization of a tax system
and concepts such as ”tax justice” are in general heavily discussed in society, research and media
(Thorndike and Ventry, 2002). Specifically, capital taxation is usually disputed substantially in aca-
demic and political discourse due to the complex nature of capital income (Bastani and Waldenström,
6
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2018). Various forms of capital taxation such as inheritance taxes have gained interest of researchers,
see Bastani and Waldenström (2019) for a recent overview. In Austria, political discourse on capital
taxation is mainly focused on a possible reintroduction of wealth taxation (abolished in 1993) and,
even more wildly debated, a possible reintroduction of inheritance taxation (abolished in 2008).
Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b present the share of respondents that generally have a positive attitude towards
inheritance taxes and wealth taxes, respectively.8 Support for inheritance taxation is generally low,
with an average of around 42% in favor of wealth taxation and 30% in favor of inheritance taxation.
Rather unsurprisingly, a split between left-wing and right-wing party voters is observed. Leftist voters
have a higher level of approval of wealth and inheritance taxation in general. Declared non-voters take
sides with the conservative parties in this question. The remaining analysis in this paper is based on
the question why tax preferences manifest themselves in such a way. One of the main aims of this
paper is thus to shed light on the differences in the process of preference formation between different
Austrian voting groups.
3.2 Opinions on Inequality, Fairness and Opportunities
Only a rather small share of the population will prefer absolute equality in outcomes when considering
fairness in society. Concepts like effort and individual skills will usually be factors that are taken into
account when discussing economic issues with a relation to fairness via concepts such as inequality and
social mobility (Hufe et al., 2018). Thus, analyzing opinions on concepts such as fairness, inequality
and equality of opportunities in the context of the welfare state is a promising candidate to explain tax
preferences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).
Toward this end, we employ standard questions used in this literature, such as how important it is that
the government redistributes income from the rich to the poor, whether they think that high income
earners most often deserve their high incomes and whether luck or effort are more important for social
advancement. In addition, two questions are included where respondents state whether they perceive
economic inequality in Austria to be a problem and whether it is problematic when poor and rich
children do not enjoy equal opportunities in life.9
Somewhat unsurprisingly, Tab. 2 shows that these views of society are strongly connected to tax pref-
erences. All estimates are statistically significant and point into reasonable directions. For instance,
respondents who think economic inequality or inequality of opportunity is a problem in Austria are
more likely to support wealth and inheritance taxation. On the other hand, respondents who think that
high income earners most often deserve their high incomes are more likely to oppose forms of capital
8 Answering ”Yes” or ”Yes with tax exempt amount” when asked whether they support the idea of this tax in Austria. Unless
otherwise stated, all descriptives presented in this article refer to weighted averages.
9 All questions except for the question on the general importance of redistribution are available only in wave two.
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Fig. 2: Importance that government redistributes from 1-10. Grey dashed line indicates sample
average. Violin plots indicate distribution of responses.
taxation such as inheritance or wealth taxes. Please note that these regression coefficients (and the
ones to follow below) can merely be interpreted as correlations, not as causal effects.
Fig. 2 shows that, on average, respondents do see government redistribution as a relatively important
issue. Again, a split between leftist and conservative voters is visible. ÖVP and NEOS voters usually
think of government redistribution as being of below average importance. Opposed to that, the group
of SPÖ / GRÜN / PILZ voters assigns above average relevance to this subject. A similar polarization
between parties is visible when exploring how problematic respondents perceive inequality in Austria
to be. The average sentiment cuts the parties in a left-wing and a right-wing group as seen in Fig. 3a
and Fig. 3b. It is visible that the severity of inequality of opportunities is on average perceived to be
higher than severity of ”mere” economic inequality. However, this might as well be a bias stemming
from a slightly harsher and more emotional wording of the respective survey question on inequality of
opportunities. On the partisanship level, the fairness related questions show rather large differences
between parties. More than 20% of conservative voters (ÖVP / FPÖ) claim that high income earners
deserve their high income most of the time (Fig. 4a). This is nearly double the share of the leftist
parties. Again, declared non-voters show similar opinions as conservative voters. On the other hand,
only around 10% of ÖVP voters claim that luck is most important for social advancement, whereas
more than 40% of GRÜN voters agree with this statement (Fig. 4b).
Summarizing, the opinions on fairness and inequality dynamics in Austria seem to be promising
candidates to explain large shares of the variation of tax preferences. These views and beliefs are
especially strongly connected to the probability of supporting wealth or inheritance taxation. In
addition, the general response patterns to these questions on a partisanship level are rather similar to
the response patterns with respect to the questions on those two types of capital taxation.
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(b) Inequality of opportunity.
Fig. 3: Severity of inequality problems in Austria from 1-5. Grey dashed line indicates sample
average. Violin plots indicate distribution of responses.
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(b) Percentage claiming luck is most important for
social advancement.
Fig. 4: Percieved fairness of economic system.
3.3 Perceptions of Inequality
In general, increasing income and wealth inequality can be observed in most parts of the Western
world in recent decades (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011). At the same time, a variety of studies points
in the direction of voters perceptions of the income distribution being extremely skewed (Gimpelson
and Treisman, 2018). Bringing this observation to the realm of redistributive preferences, Kuziemko
et al. (2015) show in an experimental setting that correcting misperceptions of inequality can shift re-
distributive preferences of individuals. They conclude that perceptions of inequality and redistributive
preferences are strongly interlinked. Thus, it seems advisable to explore the perceptions of inequality
in Austria in more detail. To do this, respondents are asked whether they think economic inequality in
Austria has increased in recent years.10 In addition, the survey includes questions on where participants
10Question only available in wave two.
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Table 3: Ineq. Perceptions and Tax Preferences
Dependent variable:
Inheritance Tax Wealth Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic Ineq. Increased 0.208∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.047)
Ratio High/Low Earner −0.008 0.001
(0.009) (0.008)
Note: All regressions are weighted logistic regressions that include age,
age squared as well as indicators for survey wave, tertiary education,
income in the highest tercile, gender and both parents being Austrian.
All regressions include an intercept. Standard errors are provided in
parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
perceive the thresholds for a ”high-income earner” and a ”low-income earner” to be. The ratio of these
two thresholds can be employed as a crude measure of perceived economic inequality (see also Kelly
and Enns, 2010). The regression results provided in Tab. 3 suggest that there are some observable
effects of inequality perceptions on tax preferences. Individuals who think that economic inequality
increased recently are more likely to support wealth and inheritance taxation. A higher perceived ratio
of high incomes to low incomes is, however, not significantly connected to higher support for capital
taxation.
At the partisanship level, the perception of economic inequality varies rather strongly between voting
groups. Less than 60%of conservative party voters and non-voters think economic inequality increased
while consistently more than 70% of progressive voters claim that this holds true for Austria (Fig. 5a).
Some interesting differences can also be found when comparing the perceived high and low income
earner thresholds across parties in Fig. 5.11 It is striking that non-voters and FPÖ voters ”observe”
the narrowest part of the income distribution relative to other voting groups. Following Windsteiger
(2017), this might correspond to individuals perceiving a very homogeneous peer group, which in turn
might lead to decreasing preferences for redistribution. However, this effect is, if present, not strong
enough to lead to overall statistical significance in our sample. Interestingly, the threshold for a low
income earner exhibits rather low variance and is around EUR 1000 for all voting groups.
11For this exercise, weighted medians are employed. Moreover, responses equal to EUR 0 for the lower bound and exceeding
EUR 100,000 for the upper bound of monthly net income are discarded to gain robustness with respect to outliers.
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(b) Perceived high and low income earner thresholds.
Fig. 5: Perceptions of inequality / high and low income earners.
4 Further Results
4.1 Perceptions of Social Mobility
Similar to perceptions of economic inequality, the perceptions of social mobility have been found to
be strongly connected to preferences for redistribution. Alesina et al. (2018) describe this relationship
in a variety of countries and conclude that, in general, left wing voters are on average more pessimistic
than right wing voters in their perceptions of social mobility. Using survey experiments, they show
that pessimistic information treatments increase support for certain types of redistributive policies. In
Austria, the perceptions of social mobility are recorded using two questions. Respondents are asked
to give an estimate for how many out of 100 poor children will end up in which quintile of the income
distribution as adults. This exercise is repeated for 100 rich children in a similar fashion. The answers
can then be directly interpreted as perceived probabilities of upward movement for poor children and
perceived probabilities of downward movement for rich children.
Tab. 4 provides regressions that connect the perceived opportunities of rich and poor children to tax
preferences. In terms of notation, ”Q1 to Q1” corresponds to the perceived probability of being born
in the lowest income quintile (Q1) and still being in the bottom quintile (Q1) as an adult. ”Q1 to Q5”
corresponds to the perceived probability of being born in the bottom quintile (Q1) and ending up in the
top quintile (Q5) of the income distribution as an adult. There is some minor evidence to be found that
connect social mobility perceptions to tax preferences in our sample. However, statistical significance
strongly depends on themodel specification. To provide some consistency, Tab. 4 presents results using
a model specification that is comparable to other subsections. In general, the direction and theoretical
interpretation of the coefficient estimates is far from trivial. Perceived mobility patterns in general are
rather complex and dynamic and thus rarely manifest themselves in a single number. Alesina et al.
(2018) find that the perceived poverty persistence ”Q1 to Q1” shows positive significant effects on
12
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Table 4: Soc. Mob. Perceptions and Tax Preferences
Dependent variable:
Inheritance Tax Wealth Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q1 to Q1 0.001 0.0001
(0.002) (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Q5 to Q1 0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Q5 to Q5 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Note: All regressions are weighted logistic regressions
that include age, age squared as well as indicators
for survey wave, tertiary education, income in the
highest tercile, gender and both parents being Aus-
trian. All regressions include an intercept. Stand-
ard errors are provided in parentheses. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
support for taxation and redistribution. On the other hand, they find that the perceived opportunity for
social advancement ”Q1 to Q5” shows negative effects on redistributional preferences. This is not the
case in our sample. In addition, the coefficients of the indicators for risk of downward movement (”Q5
to Q1”) and wealth persistence (”Q5 to Q5”) are rather hard to interpret from a theoretical perspective.
As this is to our knowledge the first study to record downward mobility perceptions in such a manner,
no theoretical framework for interpretation has been offered yet. Thus, the essential takeaway for the
case of Austria is that social mobility perceptions and support for inheritance and wealth taxes are
seemingly weakly interlinked in this ad hoc analysis of the data. Further research in the form of more
disaggregated investigations is necessary to gather a deeper understanding of this nexus.
Fig. 6a provides the perceived probability to end up in a given quintile as an adult when being born into
a poor household (”Q1 to Qx”) per party. The red dashed line indicates a scenario of absolute social
mobility. On average, the probability of poor children to end up in the highest quintile is perceived as
rather low (10%), whereas poverty persistence is estimated to be significantly higher (37%). The gen-
eral pattern with respect to partisanship is that progressive parties such as GRÜN or PILZ have much
13
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(b) Downward Mobility.
Fig. 6: Perceptions of Upward & Downward Mobility.
more pessimistic views on social mobility than conservative parties. This is in line with the findings
in Alesina et al. (2018). Furthermore, it is clearly visible that non-voters are on the more optimistic
side when it comes to social mobility perceptions. Vice versa, the same rationale holds true when
analyzing downward mobility perceptions. The perceived probabilities to end up in a given quintile
as an adult when being born in a rich household (”Q5 to Qx”) are provided in Fig. 6b. Again, leftist
leaning party voters tend to be more pessimistic, i.e. they perceive a lower degree of social mobility
as compared to conservative voters. It is furthermore striking that the perceived wealth persistence
(53%) is on average significantly higher than the perceived poverty persistence.
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Table 5: Tax Knowledge and Tax Preferences
Dependent variable:
Inheritance Tax Wealth Tax
(1) (2)
Tax Knowledge 0.085 0.078
(0.064) (0.059)
Note: All regressions are weighted logistic regres-
sions that include age, age squared as well as
indicators for survey wave, tertiary education,
income in the highest tercile, gender and both
parents being Austrian. All regressions include
an intercept. Standard errors are provided in
parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.2 Tax Knowledge
Another possible theoretical channel explaining negative attitudes towards these forms of capital tax-
ation are a lack of knowledge of the functionality and economic effects of taxes. Eriksen and Fallan
(1996) show that increasing tax knowledge reduces the likelihood of tax evasion. At the same time,
positive attitudes towards the tax system generally increase when tax knowledge increases, leading to
a higher level of perceived tax fairness. Thus, a lack of knowledge about the functionality and the
mechanics of the tax system might decrease support for inheritance and wealth taxation. For a deeper
analysis on tax knowledge in Austria refer to Kalleitner and Kittel (2017).
In the survey, respondents answer a simple question on progressive tax systems. This is used as a
proxy for knowledge on the functionality of tax systems in general.12 A dummy variable that captures
whether a respondent is able to correctly answer this question then serves as an indicator for tax
knowledge. Tab. 5 provides the results of logistic regressions that suggest that this variable cannot be
considered as statistically important predictor of the probability to agree with wealth and inheritance
taxation.
It is nevertheless interesting to look at differences in tax knowledge between parties in Fig. 7a. In
general, tax knowledge is quite low, with no voting group exceeding a share of 50%. The average
correct response rate is around 26%. PILZ voters come out strongly above average. This is in line with
a generally higher education level observed among these voters.
12Question is only available in wave two.
15
G. ZENS & P. WARUM
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ GRÜN PILZ NEOS NON
(a) Percentage that can correctly answer a question
about a progressive tax system.
Fig. 7: Tax knowledge across parties.
4.3 Perceptions of Personal Life
Early comparative politics literature that tries to explain variation in redistributive preferences often
relies on rational choice style models. A famous example is the widely cited approach of Meltzer and
Richard (1981). Essentially, the basic modeling framework expects the median voter to be increasingly
in favor of redistribution as average income exceeds median income. Thus, their model predicts that
increasing economic inequality will lead to redistribution through the democratic system. Abstracting
from this idea, these types of theoretical models point in the direction of an individual’s position in
society playing a crucial role when forming preferences with respect to taxation and the welfare state
in general. However, a large variety of empirical work opposes this theoretical framework or gives
mixed results (Bredemeier, 2014). One of the main explanations for this is that most individuals do not
correctly perceive their position in society (Cruces et al., 2013). As a result, a variety of studies have
shown that perceptions of reality are better indicators of political and economic dynamics as opposed
to objective, observed criteria (Loveless, 2013).
To connect to this literature, a question on the perceived individual socioeconomic status (SES) is
included in the survey. Here, respondents are asked to place themselves on a ladder that represents
society. Then, participants are requested to place their parents on a similar ladder for the time of
the respondent’s birth. A set of additional questions is implemented to deepen the understanding of
the experiences and perceptions with respect to the personal life of the respondents. For instance,
individuals rate their satisfaction with their current income, record whether they suffered negative
personal shocks in the recent past and whether they are optimistic about their own future.
Tab. 6 shows that there is no clear connection between these perceptions of personal life and tax
preferences in Austria and no statistically significant relationship is found.
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(a) Self-Assessed Socio-Economic Status from 1-10.
Fig. 8: Self-assessed position in society and satisfaction with income. Dots indicate average
response. Grey dashed line indicates sample average. Violin plots indicate distribution of responses.
There is also not much evidence that the perceived position in society might be a good channel to
explain much of the variation between parties. Fig. 8 depicts very similar answers for perceived SES
and satisfcation with current income for all voting groups with no significant deviations from the mean.
This is in line with a variety of results suggesting individuals have the tendency to sort themselves into
the middle of society (e.g. Fernández-Albertos and Kuo, 2018). However, these results might also be
driven by a trend towards the middle response categories that can be observed in a variety of survey
outcomes across disciplines (Kalton et al., 1980; Bishop, 1987).
4.4 Willingness to take political action
Finally, it is worth discussing some patterns arising from a question on which forms of political actions
respondents already engage in or can imagine themselves engaging in. This seems appropriate after
presenting perceptions of society as well as problems and shortcomings that individuals and voters
in Austria might sense in the political and economic system surrounding them (see Brown-Iannuzzi
et al., 2017). The results of this question are summarized in Fig. 9.
The different forms of political engagement are sorted by their average likelihood in the population.
Two observations are interesting to point out. First, left wing voters show a generally higher probab-
ility of political action than right wing voters and non-voters. As discussed before, this voting group
also displays the highest preferences for redistribution and sees income inequality and inequality of
opportunity as especially problematic. Second, the variation within forms of political engagement
varies significantly between parties. While party membership is a rather unlikely occurrence for all
respondents, the probability to attend a demonstration is nearly 50% for GRÜN voters and extremely
low for ÖVP and FPÖ voters.
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Fig. 9: Willingness to take political action in various categories.
5 Concluding remarks
In this article, views, beliefs and perceptions of individuals in Austria are connected to tax preferences,
specifically with respect to wealth and inheritance taxation. In addition, the analysis is expanded to
the partisanship level where we compare various voting groups. To accomplish this, we rely on a new
Austrian survey-based data set covering a variety of topics relevant to this stream of literature. This
data set is used for quantitative analysis to gain insight into attitudes towards taxation and the welfare
state in Austria. To our knowledge, connecting data on voting behavior, sociodemographics, tax pref-
erences, perceptions of society and attitudes towards the welfare state, redistribution and inequality is
a novum in Austria.
The analyzed voting groups differ substantially in their redistributive preferences and support for cap-
ital taxation. This comes with broad variation in their perceptions of society and in their views with
respect to the Austrian welfare state. Variables that are likely to explain a large share of the variation
in tax support include opinions on fairness in the welfare state in general as well as perceptions of the
change of inequality in the past years. On the other hand, a variety of other theoretical channels might
only play a minor role in explaining support for inheritance and wealth taxation. Overall, it has to be
noted that the presented analysis is of a descriptive and correlative kind and should be interpreted as
such.
Future research is therefore encouraged to shed more light on the causality in the nexus of partisanship
and tax preferences in the context of the welfare state. Furthermore, connecting the demand side
(i.e. the perceptions and preferences of voters and non-voters) to the supply side (i.e. the outside
communication of parties) more strongly would enable political scientists and economists to more
thoroughly explain how tax preferences in Austria are formed. Here, it would also be interesting to
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compare the perceived salience of welfare state related issues to the salience that parties assign to them
in their political messages. Moreover, compiling data that makes it possible to compare Austrian social
mobility data with social mobility perceptions could lead to new insights.
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Appendix A Relevant survey questions (in German)
A.1 Voting Behavior
• Haben Sie in der Nationalratswahl in 2017 gewählt?
– Ja
– Nein
• Welche Partei haben Sie gewählt?
– SPÖ
– ÖVP
– GRÜNE
– NEOS
– PILZ
– Andere
A.2 Wealth and inheritance Taxation
• Einige Nationen erheben derzeit eine universelle Erbschaftssteuer. Jedes Mal, wenn Vermögen (z. B.
materieller Besitz, Land, Immobilien) nach dem Tod an eine andere Person übergeht, erhält der Staat eine
Zahlung. Würden Sie solch eine Steuer gerne in Österreich eingeführt sehen?
– Ja
– Ja, mit Freibetrag
– Nein
– Unsicher
• Wie Sie vielleicht wissen, wird in Österreich von Zeit zu Zeit die Einführung einer Vermögensteuer
diskutiert. Damit ist eine Steuer auf die Summe aller Vermögensgegenstände, wie z. B. Geldbestände,
Immobilien, Fahrzeuge und Aktien, im Eigentum einer Person gemeint. Würden Sie der Einführung einer
Vermögensteuer zustimmen?
– Ja
– Ja, mit Freibetrag
– Nein
– Unsicher
A.3 Tax Knowledge
• Wir würden Sie jetzt gerne zu Einkommensteuern in Österreich befragen. Momentan besteuert Österreich
Einkommen unter 11.000€ nicht. Der Grenzsteuersatz für Einkommen zwischen 11.000€ und 18.000€
liegt bei 25%. Stellen Sie sich eine Person vor, die 15.000€ im Jahr verdient. Diese Person zahlt ...
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– ... weniger als 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern
– ... genau 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern
– ... mehr als 25% ihres Einkommens in Steuern
– Weiß nicht
A.4 Perceptions of own Personal Life
• Fig. A.1.
• Sind Sie mit Ihrem derzeitigen Einkommen zufrieden?
– Sehr zufrieden
– Ziemlich zufrieden
– Nicht allzu zufrieden
– Nicht zufrieden
• Bitte geben Sie für jedes der folgenden Ereignisse an, ob Sie davon in den letzten 5 Jahren, also seit
Anfang 2014, betroffen waren.
– Scheidung
– Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitssuche länger als 1 Monat
– Tod eines nahen Verwandten
– Krankenhausaufenthalt (außer Geburt)
– Nichts davon
• Denken Sie, dass es Ihnen in 5 Jahren besser oder schlechter als heute gehen wird?
– Besser
– Schlechter
– Weiß nicht
A.5 Perceptions of Inequality
• Denken Sie, dass wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit in Österreich in den letzten Jahren zu- oder abgenommen
hat?
– Zugenommen
– Ungefähr gleich
– Abgenommen
• Unter welcher monatlichen Nettoeinkommensgrenze (nach Abzug von Steuern) würden Sie eine Person
als "NiedrigverdienerIn" bezeichnen? (in Euro)
• Ab welcher monatlichen Nettoeinkommensgrenze (nach Abzug von Steuern) würden Sie eine Person als
"HochverdienerIn" bezeichnen? (in Euro)
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Fig. A.1: Question on SES.
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Fig. A.2: Question on upward mobility perceptions.
A.6 Perceptions of Social Mobility
• Fig. A.2.
A.7 Opinions on Inequality, Fairness and Opportunities
• Ihrer Meinung nach, verdienen Spitzenverdiener in unserer Gesellschaft ihre hohen Einkommen?
– Meistens
– Manchmal
– Selten
• Einige Leute sagen, dass man im Leben durch harte Arbeit vorankommt. Andere sagen, dass glückliche
Umstände oder die Hilfe anderer wichtiger sind. Was denken Sie ist am wichtigsten?
– Harte Arbeit ist am wichtigsten
– Harte Arbeit und Glück sind gleich wichtig
– Glück ist am wichtigsten
• Wie denken Sie darüber, wenn Kinder aus armen und reichen Familien nicht die gleichen Chancen in
ihrem Leben haben?
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– Kein Problem
– Ein kleines Problem
– Ein Problem
– Ein ernstzunehmendes Problem
– Ein sehr ernstzunehmendes Problem
– Weiß nicht
• Denken Sie wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit ist ein ernstes Problem in Österreich?
– Kein Problem
– Ein kleines Problem
– Ein Problem
– Ein ernstes Problem
– Ein sehr ernstes Problem
• Wie wichtig ist es Ihnen, dass der Staat Einkommen von reich zu arm umverteilt?
– Slider from 1 to 10
– Weiß nicht
Appendix B Data quality
To ensure data quality, four different screening procedures are employed. First, an explicit screening question
was included in the survey. This explicit screening is supposed to flag respondents that do not pay attention
during the survey. After that, we follow Alesina et al. (2018) and screen the data set for answers that are very
likely to be the result of inattentive answering of respondents. For this, we use the question on social mobility
perceptions. The question itself is outlined in App. A. We drop all respondents, that either
1. put 100 somewhere else than Q1Q1 in the upwardmobility question to skip the question as fast as possible,
or
2. put 100 somewhere else than Q5Q5 in the downward mobility question to skip the question as fast as
possible, or
3. give the exact same answers for the upward and downward mobility question.
These explicit and implicit screenings eliminate a total of nearly 1700 respondents or around 40% of the raw
sample. However, we are confident that the remaining observations are of highest quality and can be employed
for thorough analysis.
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Appendix C Post stratification marginals & weights
In this subsection, we provide the marginal distributions of age, gender, education and voting behavior that we
use to re-weight the final survey sample using an iterative post-stratification procedure.
For age and gender, we use the population statistics 2019 provided by Statistik Austria and consider the population
older than 17 years. For gender, the female share is 51,29101%. For age, the age groups are constructed similar
to the age groups that are used in the European Social Survey (ESS):
Age Group Population Share
18 - 34 0.262108831
35 - 54 0.344779475
55 + 0.393111695
Using themost recent educational statistics of Statistik Austria from 2016, the shares of primary, lower secondary,
higher secondary and tertiary education are:
Education Group Including Population Share
Primary Pflichtschule 0.2617905
Low Secondary Lehre, BMS 0.4583589
High Secondary BMHS, AHS 0.1429652
Tertiary Kolleg, Akademie, Hochschule 0.1368854
The marginal distributions for weighting with respect to the election results of the national elections 2017 are
taken from the official source at https://wahl17.bmi.gv.at/, excluding voters of ”other” parties. Thus, the
target population are Austrians older than 17 who have not voted for ”other” parties in the national elections
2017, equaling around 7,130,225 individuals. Summary statistics on the distribution of the individual weights
can be found below:
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1176 2514 4297 6141 7001 67489
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